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BUSINESS FLUCTUATIONS IN JAPANESE ECONOMY 
DURING THE INTER-WAR PERIOD 
By 
Hideo AOYAMA* and Toro NISHIKAWA** 
I. General Features of Business Fluctuations in Japan. 
If we attempt to plot the development of Japanese economy since the 
Meiji Restoration on a chart, it looks, broadly speaking, like a straight line 
showing a high rate of growth. The real national income and industrial 
production has always increased except during a few periods. Therefore, 
it has often been said that it is quite difficult to detect busiuess cycles in 
the sense of fluctuations in aggregate real output in Japanese economy. 
Also, some Japanese economists say that business fluctuations cannot be dis-
tinctly observed in Japanese economy because of the strong trend towards 
rapid growth." In spite of these opinions, we can still find in Japanese 
economy that there clearly existed business fluctuations in a different sense 
from those mentioned above. That is, when we lay emphasis on repercussion 
mechanism rather than on individual impulses to economic progress, we will 
be able to detect business fluctuations in the alternations of two kinds of 
phases, "the phase of accumulation" and" the phase of advance ", which 
will be explained below! a) 
The first kind of phase is so-called period of prosperiry or "the phase 
of advance" which is usually caused by the increase in export. In this 
phase, we have a favorable balance of payments and a large increase in 
industrial production. The second kind of phase, "the phase of accumulation" 
* Professor of Economics at Kyoto University. 
** A Member of The Kyoto University Economic Society. 
1) See discussion in K. Okawa; "The Rate of Growth in Japanese Economy", in S. Tsuru 
and K. Okawa (edited); Analysis of Japanese Economy (Nippon Keizai no Bunseki) 1953, 
p. 43, and M. Shinohara, U The Rate of Growth in Industrial Production". OPe Cit., 
pp. 67-69. 
la) Each country has its own pattern of impulses to business cycle which gives some charact. 
eristic features to the course of business cycle in that country, on the one hand, and is suject 
to change in the course of history, on the other hand. The pattern of impulses to business 
cycles in Japan is a topic to be studied through the history of business cycles there. But we 
will not enter into this problem in this article. 
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is so-called period of depression. In this period, the balance of payments is 
unfavorable and the rate of increase in industrial production is less than in 
the first kind of phase and apparently business conditions seem inactive. 
But, in spite of the decline in the rate of increase in industrial produc-
tion in the second kind of phase, the amount of capital formation seldom 
decreases as a wh-
ole compared with 
the first kind of 
phase, but increases 
in some industries. 
The second kind 
of phase is "the 
phase 'of accumu-
la tion" where the 
energy or motive 
power for the next 
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Chart 3. Real Capital Formation 
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Source; M. Shinohara; The Estimates of Capital Formation by the 
Commodity-Flow Method, Structural Analysis of Japanese 
Economy (Nippon Keizai no Kozo Bunseki), Vol. I, 1954, 
p.280. 
If we view business cycles in 
Japanese economy from the begi-
nning of this century to the out-
break of World War II, as the 
alternations of the two phases" ad-
vance" and" accumulation," we 
may divide that period into the 
following: 
1906-1913 ......... The second 
kind of phase (accumulation) 
1914--1919 ........ · The first 
kind of phase (advance) 
1920-1931 ......... The second 
kind of phase (accumulation) 
1932-1939 ........ · The first 
kind of phase (advance) 
An important point to be not-
ed here is that these two phases 
are closely inter-related and affect 
each other. Prosperity accompanied 
wi th the increase in export in the 
first kind of phase, yields new in-
vestment opportunities and new 
investment funds. Moreover, it 
Chart 4. The Increase In Capacity of Electric 
Power Generation and Increase in the Number 
of Spindles and Cotton Yarn Production in 
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Source; The capacity of electric power genera-
tion-A Survey of Electric Power Industry 
(Denki Zigyo Yoran) , 
The number of spindles and the volume of 
production-K. Seki; The Cotton Industry of 
Japan, Japan Society for Promotion of Science. 
increases the foreign exchange reserves. It is needless to 
considerably increase when there are large opportunities 
say that investments 
for investment, large 
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funds for investment and accumulated foreign exchange reserves. This is a 
characteristic point in the first kind of phase. But it is especially important 
that investment opportunities in the first phase do not disappear even after 
the business conditions have moved into the second phase. If we study it 
in detail, there are differences in content and character of investment 
opportunities between the two phases. But in any event, investment oppor-
tunities continue in the second phase and those investments are financed 
with abundant funds accumulated within firms and available in the money 
market. The real capital formation in the second phase is characterized 
by these facts. Particularly, at the beginning of the second phase, when 
investment funds and foreign exchange reserves are quite abundant, sometimes 
the government is positively inclined to take an easy money policy and 
supplies money abundantly. In this case, capital formation will be expanded 
to a considerable extent. 
As shown in Chart 4,') the increases in capacity of electric power plants 
in the period from 1920 to 1931 was not less than in periods before and 
after that period. And in the same period as seen in Chart 4, although the 
production of cotton yarn hardly increased due to output restrictions, on the 
other hand the number of spindles installed steadily increased. We cannot 
neglect the fact that financial conditions which were brought about in the 
first phase (during World War I) preceding this second phase, such as un-
distributed profit accumulated during World War I and the monetary policy 
in the period after the war, contributed to the investment in the cotton spinning 
industry during this period, though there existed factors to increase the capital 
coefficient in that industry (for instance, the legislation prohibiting mid-
2) To show the amount of capital formation, changes in the number of spindles in cotton 
spinning industry and in the capacity of electric power generation are shown in the Chart 
4 to complement the estimates by Prof. Shinohara which is shown in Chart 3, (" The Esti. 
mates of Capital Formation by the Commodity Flow Method." in I. Nakayama (edited); Struct-
ural Analysis of Japanese Economy (Nippon Keizai no K6z6 Bunseki), 1954, pp. 265-287). 
These two industries are representatives of two different kinds of industry, and fairly reliable 
data are available for these industries. Therefore, these industries are selected. As for Prof. 
Shinohara's estimates, there seem to be two reasons for the underestimation of figures in the 
twenties. One is the assumption in his analysis that the ratio of freight charge of a com-
modity to its total production cost is always constant. As he himself points out, the ratio is 
actually larger in a price falling period like the twenties. because of the rigidity of freight 
charge rate compared with the general price level. Another reason is the larger fall in prices 
of investment goods than con:sumption goods in the twenties as well as other price falling 
periods, though the values of investment for fixed equipment are deflated by the general 
wholesale price index in his estimates. 
Besides Prof. Shinohara's estimates, the following estimates of capital formation are avai-
labl.c; the estImates from statistical data of finance, for example, Y. Yamada (edited);Japanese 
Natlonal Income Statistics (Nippon Kokumin Shotoku Suikei ShiTYO). 1951; the estimates from 
nabonal wealth statistics, for example, K. Okawa (edited); The Rate of Growth in Japanese 
Economy (Nippon Keiz;ai no Seichiirit"u), 1955, Chap. 8. 
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night labor for women and the increase in fine yarn production instead of 
coarse yarns.) Therefore, we can say that the amount of investment in Japan 
is determined by the availability of investment funds and the amount of 
foreign exchange reserve rather than the rate of increase in production as 
explained by the acceleration principle. In this way, the first phase affects 
the second phase. Conversely, capital formation in the second kind of phase 
expand and improve the productive capacity in order to prepare the next 
prosperity and expansion of exports. As examples of this point, we shall 
show below in detail, how much of the capital formation in the cotton spinning 
industry and the electric power industry, as shown in Chart 4, in the period 
from the end of World War I to the beginning of the thirties contributed 
to the economic development after 1932. 
Considering the alternation of the two phases mentioned above, of advance 
and accumulation, from the viewpoint of industrial structure, it may be said 
that Japanese economy has developed quite well as a whole, but on the other 
hand, the development pattern of particular industries is not always the same. 
We can observe considerable differences in the speed and pattern of develop-
ment among various industries. On the one hand, there are steadily develop-
ing industries, and on the other hand, industries which are susceptible to fluctua-
tions, and also those in intermediate positions between them. From such a point 
of view, we can divide whole industries into the following four groups.') 
1) Industries depending mainly on foreign demand. These are the most 
fluctuating industries. For example, raw silk, ship building, cotton yarn and 
cotton fabric. 
2) Industries depending mainly on the demand from the private sector 
of the domestic market. (These depend merely on the scale of private do-
mestic market, not as group 3). Fluctuating pattern of this group is inter-
mediate between 1 and 3, 4. Examples of industries belonging to this group 
are food, textile products and miscellaneous goods for domestic consumption. 
3) Industries depending mainly on the demand from the private sector 
of the domestic market, and depending on the growth of economy or the 
change in fundamental conditions of economic structure. (For example, the 
emergence of new industries caused by the adoption of new technology or the 
concentration of population in cities in those days.) These industries develop 
always very rapidly and fluctuations are hardly detected. For example, 
chemical goods, electric power, printing and gas. 
3) In this grouping, manufacturing industries are considered alone. If we add agriculture to this 
grouping, it may be better to let it belong to group I, this seems to be natural, since the 
fluctuation in agriculture quite severe and it was brought by the inflow of rice from colonies 
and by the decline in export of raw silk in the inter.war period. 
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4) Industries depending mainly on governmental expenditure. These 
industries has a fast and steady rate of growth almost without fluctuations. 
FQf example, transportation, communication and a part of metal and machine 
industries. 
Regarding "the alternation of the two kinds of phase, of advance and 
accumulation" as the characteristic of business cycles in Japan, we can 
observe this feature in the inter-war period distinctly and apparantly.') It is 
also true that such characteristic existed in the period before World War I or 
after World War II. But we cannot clearly discern it in these periods, because 
of the immaturity of Japanese capitalism as for the period before World 
War I and because of the special conditions due to the reconstruction and 
,confusion as for the period from the end of the World War II up to 
recent time. 
Therefore the inter-war period is appropriate for a case study of the 
business cycles in Japan. This study will be naturally helpful in understanding 
the periods prior to World War I and also the period after World War II. 
n. Characteristics of Japanese 
Economy in The Inter-War 
Period 
The following six points are the 
,most outstanding characteristics of this 
. period. 
1) Industrialization. In the pe-
riod before World War I, the primary 
industries (agriculture and fishing) oc-
cupied a larger place in the national 
income than the secondary industries 
(manufacturing, mmmg, construction 
and public utilities). In the secondary 
industries such as the light industries in 
which the textile industry is the most 
important, were dorniant. (See Chart 5 
and 6.) 
World War I had a fairly strong 
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1918 ~ 1922 
4l% 
45% 
1928 ~ 1932 
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1933 ~ 1937 
D 
Agriculture Mining and Others 
and Fishery Manufacturing 
Source; Y. Yamada; J apaneseN ationa1 
Income Statistics (Nippon Kokumin 
Shotoku Shukei Shiryo), 1951. 
4) In Japan, war-conditions began to exist in 1937 with the outbreak of the war with China. 
Therefore, it must be noted that the years which are illustrated with statistical data in this 
article do not always include the entire inter-war period. 
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of Japan. As the war deprived European countries of the power to produce 
export goods, Japan was forced to promote and strengthen the production 
Chart 6. 
77.3% 
1908 - 1912 
71,4% 
1913 - 1917 
68.6% 
1918 - 1922 
70.2% 
1923 - 1927 
61.3 % 
47.8% 
1938 - 1937 
• D Heavy Industries Light Industries 
Heavy Industries-Metal, M'Echinery, Chemi-
cals, Clay and Glass, Gas, 
and Electricity. 
Light Industries-Textiles, 'Lumbering, Prin-
ting, Food and others. 
Source; the same as Chart 5. 
of metals, machines and chemicals 
which had been imported from Euro-
pean countries up to that time. Ja-
panese products began to have a 
chance to replace European products 
not only in the domestic market, but 
also in foreign market too, because of 
the decrease in European exports to the 
area.') The case of textile industry is a 
representaive instance of such an expan-
sion. This increase in Japanese export 
to the Asian market brought abont 
the rapid growth of the Japanese 
textile industry. In association with 
this expansion of textile production, 
Japan had to develop the spinning 
machinery manufacturing industry 
within the country, for it became 
impossible to import machines. Besi-
des spinning machinery manufacturing 
industry, there were not a few indu-
stries which developed in Japan be-
cause of the cessation of imports.') 
2) Improvements in external economy. Modernization of industrial 
structure is possible only if it is prepared by and accompanied with the suffi-
cient progress in electric power generation, in ferrous metal production, in 
facilities for railway transportation and communication, as well as in highway 
construction and educational facilities. Capital formation in the field concerned 
in external economy developed steadily and remarkably during the period 
5) Before the outbreak of War I, European countries showed a strong desire to command the 
Asian market, particularly the Chinese market. After the ChinoJapanese War, Russia, Britain, 
France, Germany, and United States had tried often to export capital for the construction of 
railways and the exploitation of mines in China. But the outbreak of war kept them from 
continuing their capital export. Then Japan got a good chance to export her capital to Chma 
which was accumulated during the war. The sum of capital export from Japan to China 
in the two years, 1917 and 1918, amounted to 250 million yen, This amount is nearly two 
times the sum of Japanese capital expon to China up to World War I. Moreover, in 1915, 
China was made to accept the twenty one demands which contained the extention of the 
leasing period of the Kwantung Province, and the extention of the field of Japanese econo-
mic activity in Manchuria. Thus, Japanese political influence and economic activity in Chi-
na, particularly in ManchW'ia, were rapidly 5tJ'engthened. 
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from the end of World War I to the beginning of the thirties. This fact is 
the most important factor to explain the rapid industrialization and moder-
niza tion of Japanese economy during this period and the thirties. 
Developments in facilities for transportation and communication, such as 
the railway, telephone, highway and so on, are basic for modernization of 
economic society. And, as Adam Smith and Alfred Marshall pointed out, 
extensions in higher education in order to train engineers, office workers for 
management, government official and medical doctors with modem training 
are the primary requirement for economic development. It is very important 
to understand the meaning of rapid increase in investments for school esta-
blishment in this period which was effective and successful by favor of his-
torical backgrounds of our country. 
In those public utilities, capital fonnation in this period was so active 
and on a very large scale. We can say that this investment enabled Japanese 
6) Following industries are important among them; 
Steel--With the rapid increase in demand due to the war, both the number of factories 
and the amount of production considerably increased. The level of production was raised 
from 280 thousand tons in 1914 to 540 thousand tons in 1919. During the war, steel manu-
facturing factories were constructed in Korea and Manchuria, and the steel production in these 
two areas amounted to 190 thousand tons in 1919. The increa.<;ing trend in steel production 
in Japan Proper and colonies continued in the period after the war. We can not neglect 
the effect of governmental protection of the steel industry by the law promoting iron and 
steel production, in order to understand the increase in steel production. 
Pulp--With the cessation of imports, this industry developed in Sakhalin. At least 
eight factories were constructed by 1926, by Oji Paper Manufacturing Company and Sakhalin 
Industrial Company. 
Wool product--Sixteen companies were established during the war and after the war. 
Dyes--The dye manufacturing industry developed with the cessation of import from 
Europe. In 1914, Mitsui Mining Company began to produce it for the first time. Since 
then the development of this industry was rapid, supported by the protective policy for 
military need by government. 
Cement--This developed during the war too. This industry was favorably effected by 
the increase in demand for reconstruction after the earthquake in 1923. 
Glass-Asahi Glass Manufacturing Company was established in 1907, and Japan Glass 
Manufacturing Company was established in 1918. Both developed rapidly after the War. 
Table I. 
Ispinning machines and\ paper 
tools production production 
I soda I woolen cloth I steel 
production production production 
1914 0.8 25.1 11.5 58.5 
1919 21.9 116.6 23.8 61.3 
1923 16.9 103.6 43.2 144.4 
1925 19,4 119.7 56.0 134.1 
1927 21.3 116.2 53.1 198.2 
umt; spmmng machmes and} '1I' tools paper .... ··a rul Ion yen 
soda······················· .. ········a million pounds 
woolen cloth .............. · .. · .. ·a million yards 
steel ·················· .... ······· .. ··a thousand tons 
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economy to grow rapidly after this period as a modern industrial country in 
.whose industrial structure heavy and chemical industries are dominant.') 
Another important point is the increase in imports which was necessary 
for the expansion of production facilities and which was paid for from the 
foreign exchange reserves gained by the enormous excess export during the 
war. In short, the capital formation in this period was supported by foreign 
money reserves gained during the war. We can see here the great contribu-
tion of World War I to the economic development of Japan. 
3) Efforts to hnprove banking systelD. Contrary to the tendency 
towards industrialization and the expansion in production, there remained 
backward factors in Japanese economy. Those factors were disturbing ele-
ments in the economy. One of the most conspicuous scene of this backward-
ness was shown in the sphere of money and banking. Those were of the 
Table 2. important causes for panics which occurred quite 
Change in Number of Bank often for ten years from the end of World War 
(the number of head offices: I. Japanese economy in the early half of the 
not including branch offi-
ces) inter-war period, i. e. from 1920 to 1931, if we 
1920 2,062 express them rather schematically and boldly, were 
1921 2,037 the rapid progress and modernization on the real 
1823 2,002 side and confusion caused by friction or malad-
1824 1,893 justment between the real side to be modernized 
1925 1,817 and the non-modernized monetary side. Causes 
1926 1,721 and situations in this confusion will be explained 
1927 1,595 below, summarizing and following K. Takahashi's 
1928 1,445 "The history of business fluctuations in Taish6 and 
1928 1,178 
1929 1,023 Sh6wa periods". (Taisho Showa Zaikai Hendoshi). 
1930 913 One of the important causes for the confusion in 
1931 811 Japanese economy was that it was deficient in 
1932 663 modernized business organization and in competent 
1933 637 managers, which were necessary in modernizing 
1934 597 economy to overcome the prevailing old-fashioned 
Source; The Reference Book traditionalism of those days. Another important 
of Monetary Matters. point relating to this were the drawbacks in the 
(Kinyiljikii Sankiisyo) banking system. 
In this period, there existed quite a number of small banks which were 
.basically unstable and unsound in their organization and management. (See 
Table 2.) Moreover, there were not a few among the small banks which 
were actually under single-proprietorship and were connected personally with 
7) About the investments for development in external economy we shall explain in detail 
in the nex.t section. 
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a small number of particular companies. The existence of those old-fashioned 
small banks hindered the modernization of the industrial structure and was 
one of the important reasons for financial panics. It must be added at this 
point that governmental policies to improve the banking conditions were often 
not adequate. For example, at the time of the panic of 1920, the govern-
ment patched up the crisis temporarily by lending money to companies in 
trouble as they please. As a result of such a policy, companies which were 
going bankrupt from bad management, could survive by borrowing and banks 
in bad financial conditions were still in business because they were able to 
borrow from the central bank easily. Thus, inadequate monetary policies 
prolonged financial confusion and worsened economic conditions. 
The financial panic in 1927 provided the turning point in monetary 
policy. After that, the influance of small banks was weakened by the con-
centration of deposits in big banks and they decreased in number by the 
amalgamation of banks. Government began the inspection of banks according 
to the bank regulation laws enforced from 1928. With these policies financial 
confusion was over and gradually the banking system in Japan was improved 
to become adequate for the needs of industrial activity in nodern. economic 
society. 
Table 3. 
The Increase of Loans I\ew Issue of Stocks+ Net Increare of Bonds (A) from All Banks (B) + Undistributed Profit (A)i(B) (in millions of yen) (in million of yen) 
1914 79 262 +0.30 
1917 614 1095 +0.56 
1918 942 1673 +0.56 
1919 1112 1337 +0.83 
1920 1012 2360 +0.43 
1921 550 1456 +0.38 
1922 348 1232 +0.28 
1923 405 919 +0,44 
1924 304 1183 +0.26 
1925 671 1590 +0.42 
1926 584 1157 +0.50 
1927 - 294 1230 -0.24 
1928 
-
90 1532 -0.06 
1929 92 1228 +0.07 
1930 17 803 +0.02 
1931 
-
34 680 -0.05 
Note; Overdrafts and discOWlts are not included in figures of loan 
from banks in the above table. 
Source; The Reference Book of Monetary Matters (Kinyujiko Sankosyo) 
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Chart 7. The increase of loans from all banks (not including ouerdrafts 
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Source; The Reference Book of Monetary Matters 
(Kiny~iiko SankOsyo) 
* The value of denominator of above expression is always 
positive in the years we are concerned in this article, 
as you see in Table 3. 
Now, what differences can we see on the monetary side between the two 
kinds of phases, those of " accumulation" and" advance", looking from the 
view point of capital formation? Chart 7. and Table 3, show ratios in each 
year of the supply of loanable funds from banks for industrial use to the 
supply from other sources (bonds, stocks and undestributed profit). (Sudden 
falls on this ratio in 1920 and 1927 were due to financial panics). We can 
see from this table that, in the period of prosperity, supply of loanable funds 
to industries come from banks much more than from other sources and in 
the depression period, it comes from other than banks. In other words, when 
the rate of increase in production is high, the large!' part of necessary funds 
for firms comes from banks, and when the rate of increase in production 
declines, the amount of lending from banks to companies declines also. 
4) Organization of laborers. An interesting fact in the twenties is the 
rise in money wage rate contrary to the declining trend of price levels after 
the peak in 1920 and the considerable improvement in real wages (Chart 8.). 
It is certain that the rise in labor productivity raised real wages but the active 
labor movement which prospered after the end of world War I, together with 
the historical change in social climate which was going on at that time, 
might have contributed to it. As shown in Table 4, the number of factories 
and factory laborers greatly increased, particularly there occurred a influx 
of laborers into large factories and the ratio of the number of man-workers 
among all workers increased after War I. Those facts favored the 
organization of laborers. 
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Chart 8. 
500 
money wage index (1900-100) 
400 
300 
200 wholesale price index -----(1900-100) 
100 
1920 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
Source; Wholesale price index--
The Reference Book of Monetary Matters (Kinyiljiko SankOsyo) 
Money wage index--Wage statistics by Ministry of Commerce 





1919 IThe Rate of Increase 
The Total Number 31,717 43,949 138% 
of Factories 
500-1000 workers 124 202 163% 
more than 1000 workers 85 160 188% 
The Total K umber thousands thousands 
of Workers 948 1520 160% 
500-1000 83 139 167% 
more than 1000 161 342 212% 
Proportion of 
men-workers 40.5% 46.5 -
. . 
.' . . . Source; StatIstIcs of FactOries (KoJYo Tokezhyo) 
5) Differences in 
incolDe level between 
agricultural and nonag-
ricultural sectors. The 
four points, shown above 
as characteristics of this 
period were indicators of 
the modernization of eco-
nomy. 
But, in spite of mo-
dernization of economy, 
the agricultural sector re-
mained still as underde-
veloped sector and the 
'income level of agricultural sector has risen less than the non-agricultural 
sector since this period. As seen in Table 5, the growth rate of real income 
per capita in agriculture (and forestry) greatly diminished in this period 
compared with the preceeding periods. This was because the increase in 
productivity in agriculture had gradually become stagnant since this period 
and because the price ratio of agricultural products to non-agricultural pro· 
ducts hardly rose (0.2 %, as seen in the table). The reasons for the fact that 
the relative price between agricultural and non-agricultural products hardly 
changed in spite of the divergence in productivity between the two sectors are 
as follows. 
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* Figures III this table show the average rate of increase per year, 
Source; Y. Yamada; Japanese National Income Statistics 
(Nippon Kokumin Shotoku Suikei Shiryo) 
K. Okawa; Dynamic Analysis of Agriculture 
(Nogyo no Dotai Bunseki) 
First, the agricultural sector in the thirties was beginning to lose its foreign 
market for raw silk and, in addition, was depressed by the inflow of rice 
from the colonies. (Rice was and still is a main product of Japanese far-
mers and its price is the most crucial determinant of their income level.)') On 
the other hand, non-agricultural sector was expanding the foreign market 
for its products. Secondly, perfect competition was predominant in the 
.agricultural sector though there were some manufactured products which were 
supplied by monopolisitic firms to the agricultural sector. 
Thus, it became easy to get laborers to work for cheap wages in indu-
stry because of the divergence in income level between the two sectors. 
The agricultural sector in this period acted, so to speak, as a buffer for busi-
ness cycles. It supplied laborers and absorbed the unemployed adapting 
faithfully to the fluctuating demand for laborers in the non-agricultural 
sector, withont requiring any big care from government and the non-agricul-
tural sector. Thus troubles of the manufacturing sector due to business fluctu-
uations was mitigated at the cost of the agricultural sector. 
6) Decline in free international trade. Exports greatly increased 
since the latter half of 1932. It is convenient to divide countries trading 
with Japan into two regions: the regions dominated by Japanese political 
power (Formosa; Korea, and Manchuria) and others. We can see that the 
I) Professor Seiichi Tobata's "The Development of Japanese Agriculture" (Nippon Nogyo 
no Tenkai Katei), 1936 Iwanami Publishing Co. gives the most brilliant analysis of this 
process. 
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proportion of export to the dominated areas among the total exports increas-
ed as time went by (See table 6.). 
Table 6. (in millions of yen) 
I (A) Total Exports of I (B) Exports to Colonies I 
Japan Proper and Manchuria (A)-(B) I 
(B)/(A) 
1930 1903 557 1346 0,29 
1931 1508 439 1069 0.29 
1932 1829 566 1263 0.31 
1933 2382 824 1557 0.34 
1934 2827 1058 1769 0.37 
1935 3312 1239 2071 0.37 
1936 3636 1441 2195 0.39 
Source; The Cabinet Bureau of Statistical Statistical, Year Book 
of Japan (Nippon Teikoku Tokei Nenkan) 
This was brought about, as known well, by import restrictions, the rais-
ing of tariff walls and the increasing tendency towards the division of world 
trade into blocs as seen typically in the Ottawa Agreement of 1932. The 
volume of export to those regions which were not influenced by Japanese 
political power, conld not increase because of restrictive trade policies there. 
On the other hand, the volume of trade between our country and those within 
our sphere of influence increased very much, just in contrast with that tendeney, 
and this was one of the important reasons for the prosperity in the thirties. 
We have thus far explained the main characteristics of Japanese econo-
my in the inter-war period. Now, how were these characteristics related to 
business cycles which we called" alternations of two phases, the phase of accu-
mulation and the phase of advance"? Our next problem is to answer this 
question. At first, in the next section, we shall consider the capital forma-
tion in the period from the end of World War I to the beginning of the 
thirties (1920-1931) as a representative of the phase of accumulation. Then, 
in section 4, we shall consider how the capital formation in this period 
contributed to the "phase of advance" after 1937. 
m. "The Phase of AcculDulation" after World War I. 
We can enumerate the following five items as the most remarkable 
among investment activities in the phase of accumulation from the end of 
World War I to 1931. 
I) Investment in public utilities (railways, communication, public works, 
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Investment in industries cempeting with import geods 
Investment in colonies 
Investment in housing construction 
"Bubble" investments in the period after World War I 
I) Investment in public utilities. As explained in the last section, 
investment in this field was one of the main characteristics of this period. 
In the period from the end of the Meiji era to the beginning of the Taisho 
era (from the period after the end of Russo.:Japanese War to the outbreak 
of World War I), we had an extremely unfaverable balance ef payments 
en account ef active investments within the ceuntry and the specie reserve 
was almest exhausted. In erder to' protect the specie reserve, the government 
was ferced to' take a deflatienary pelicy. But the crisis was averted fertunate-
Iy by the outbreak ef the Werld War. The prosperity and the accumula-
tien ef a large ameunt ef fereign reserves during the war gave the gevern-
ment pessibilities to' take a positive fiscal policy since 1918 er 1919. The 
principle ef nen-deficit budget in fiscal pelicy which had been held since the 
end ef the Meiji era was new abelished and gevernment bends were raised 
in erder to' get means fer military purpeses and investments in public utili-
ties. This issue ef goverment bonds ameunted to' large sums as seen in Table 7. 
Table 7. 
(in millions of yen) 
















Source; Annual Reports 
of Ministry of Finance. 
(Okurasyo Nenpo) 
Nearly half the ameunt ef gevernment bends 
issued in this peried was to' finance the increase 
in military expenditure and the ether half was 
to' finance the investments in public utilities. 
Gevernment expenditure fer investment in the 
latter field was obvionsly necessiated in order 
to' develop the faclities for external econemy ac-
companying the speeding up ef the expansien in 
industrial production and the structural progress 
ef industries. In the amount ef gevernment bonds 
issued for public utilities, the largest percentage 
was for railway constructien and improvement. 
(It was bigger than the expenditure for industrial 
development in the celonies.) Other uses were for 
investment in telephone and telegraph equipment, 
scheel censtructien and highway constructien. A 
large percentage of public bonds issued by local 
governments was used for public werks like road 
construction. Table 8 shows the amount of mo-
ney invested in these public utilities. It must be 
emphasized that the large amounts ef investments paved the way for the 
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transition to a new industrial structure and that it contributed to expansions 
in the next period, that is, the phase of advance after 1932.8) 
Table 8. (in milltons of yen) 
I 1914 I 1919 I 1923 I 1925 I 1927 
Construction and Improvement 
of Railways I 79.4 I 208.1 I 299.0 I 309.1 I 368.9 
Construction of Telephone 
System I 2.9 I 19.4 I 22.5 I 32.4 I 46.3 
Construction and Improvement 
of Telegraph System I - I 4.1 I 5.2 I 1.7 I 
2_3 
Public Works 
I 63.0 I 96.8 I 224.6 243.5 I 276.6 (by Local Government) 
Construction of Public Schools 
I 
1.8 I 7.6 I 20.7 I 14.0 I 10.8 and Research Institutes 
I 1920-1923 I 1924-1927 
Construction and Improvement 
I 1115 I 
1311 of Railways 
Construction of Telephone 
System I 123 I 142 
Construction and Improvement 27 
I 
11 
of Telegraph System 
Public Works 
I 735 I 1033 (by Local Government) 
Public Works 
I 157 I 118 (by Central Government) 
.;~ Expenditures for consttuctlQn and Improvement of prIvate raIlways and 
municipal tramways as well as national railways are included in figures 
of these tables. 
)j< Figures in the upper table show the amount of expenditure per year. 
Figures in the lower table show the total amount of expenditure in years 
indicated. 
Source; Annual Report of Ministry of Finance (Okurosyo Nenpo) Asahi 
Press, Japan Economic Statistics (Nippon Keizai Tokei Sokan) 
Besides investments in public utilities by government, private investments 
8) The investments in railways and communication facilities greatly increased after rapid 
government expenditure began in 1918 or 1919. The investment in private railways also 
increased in about 1920, which was stimulated by the boom at that time. Most of the public 
works was financed by local governments, as seen in Table 8, Nearly half of local govern-
ment expenditure for public works was used for road construction, and among other expen-
diture items, river works, bridge construction and construction of water-supply systems and 
drain systems were the most important items. 
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were made in electric power and gas. It was in this period that the electric 
power industry grew to one of big industries of our country. The produc-
tion of electric power increased year by year and the construction of power 
transmission lines greatly advanced (See Table 9, and Chart 4.) The develop-
ment in the electric power industry was stimulated by the requirement for 
Table 9. 
The Total Capacity I Power Transmission Index of Miles of The Amount of In-
of Electric Power, Lines (in miles) Power Transmission vestment of each 
(1000 KW) Lines year in Electric Po-
wer Industry (in 
millions of yen) 
1914 716 4739 
- 82.9 
1919 1134 6863 100 154.3 
1921 1526 9745 142 
-
1923 2058 11661 167 376.8 
1925 2768 14890 217 -
1927 3468 18106 264 540.2 
Source; Asahl Press; Japan Economic Statistics (Ntppon ket~a'l Tiikez Siikan) 
the exploitation of energy sources which came with the progress in industrializ 
ation from the end of the Meiji era. Particularly, as a result of the facts 
that the development in hydro-electric power generation made it possible to 
reduce the cost of electric power at the beginning of the Taisho era (in the 
period after 1910) and that the tungsten bulb began to be used at nearly 
the same time, the demand for eltctric power for both power use and 
lighting increased and this increase in its demand enconraged investments in 
the electric industry. The development in this industry will take a significant 
role in the economic deVelopment in succeeding periods, since it will support 
the development of chemical industry and of small scale firms in various 
industries, as will be explained below. 
2) Investlnent in industries cOlDpeting with ilDport goods. As ex-
plained above, in (I) of the last section, the cessation of imports from 
Western countries during World War I forced our country to produce by 
herself what had been imported until World War I. Thus new industries 
were established to produce goods competing with import goods and the 
capital formation was advanced in those industries. As mentioned above, 
those industries consisted of steel, spinning machines, wool products, pulp, 
soda, dyes, cement and glass industries. But it was in the period after 1932 
tha t the increase in production in these new industries became outstanding. 
We cannot neglect the effect of the raising of our tariff after the end of the 
war for the protection of new industries. 
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3) InvestDlent in colonies. Thirdly, investments in the colonies seemed 
to be quite a large amount. Development in agricultural production and 
construction of railways, roads and port facilities in Korea and Formosa 
were greatly advanced in this period. Moreover, investment in iron produc. 
tion in Korea and Manchuria and the construction of Japanese spinning 
factories in China, though it was not a Japanese colony, were advanced too. 
4) InvestDlent in housing construction. With the progress of manu. 
facturing industries, opportunities for jobs in cities increased and the real 
wage rate of factory workers was raised. So the influx of popUlation into 
cities was very marked in this period. 
It will not be difficult to imagine that it brought about active invest· 
ments in housing construction. We can see how strong the demand for 
dwelling houses was and how great the shortage of dwelling houses was in 
those days from the high rent, high price of lumber (general price index 
was declining since 1920 as shown in Chart 8. while, on the contrary, the 
rate of rent and the price of lumber was still rising as shown in Table 10) 
and repeated suits over rented houses. 
Table 10 
I 
Index of House-Rent 
I 
Lumber Price Index 
1914 100 lOa 
1919 168 257 
1922 247 304 
. T 1 R en Osaka ) The Rauo of House.Rent to ota evenue city m 1921 
Monthly Revenue 30- 4O(yen) 15-25% 
60- 70 8-18 
90-100 6-14 
120-130 5-12 
Source; The Department of Social Research of Osaka 
MWlicipal Office, Annual Reports of Housing in Osaka 
City. (Osakashi Jutaku Nenpo) 
5) " Bubble" invest. 
Dlents in the period 
just after World War I. 
There seems to have been 
a fairly large amount of 
" bubble" investment for 
speculative purpose. In 
1919 and 1920, small 
companies mushroomed 
one after the other, and 
most of them stimulated by 
the deceptive boom at that 
time which disappeared 
within a few years (parti. 
cularly in spinning and 
food industries). We can see this fluctnation in Table 11 clearly. (Dissolu. 
tions and decrease in capital of joint stock companies increased rapidly after 
1921.) These" bubble" investments for speculative purposes was a feature 
shOwing the unsound side of our economy in those days, with movements 
in the stock markets and commodity market were disturbed by speculation. 
Drawbacks in the monetary system as explained in the last section, aggra. 
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Table II. (in millions of yen) 
New Establishment and Increase Dissolution and Decrease of Ca-










* Figures In the table are the amount of paid-up capItal. 
Source; Asahi Press, Japanese Economic Statistics 
(Nippon Keizai TOkei Sokan) 
These developments in capital formation increased the import of invest-
ment goods in the form of imports of machines and raw materials to pro-
duce investment goods. Unfavorable balance of payments in this period 
was caused by the increase in imports rather than the decrease in export 
and though the increase in consumption goods import was not so small, the 
increase in investment goods import was remarkable in the total increase of 
import. This increased import was used in laying the foundation for an 
amazing advance in Japanese economy during the next phase. It is needless 
to say that most of the excess import was paid for by accumulated foreign 
exchange accumulated during the war. In this sense, the building up of 
Japanese economy in this period was supported by accumulated foreign ex-
change during World War I. 
IV. "The Phase of Advance" after 1932. 
After Britain's suspension of the gold standard in September of 1931, 
there was a capital outflow from our country in anticipation of a gold em-
bargo in our country. Moreover, we had unstable situations within and 
outside the country, i. e. the Manchurian Incident breaking out in the same 
month as above and the May 15th incident in May of 1932 about half a 
year after the gold embargo. These incidents made the exchange rate for 
Japanese currency fall. (See Table 12.) This fall in exchange rate enabled 
us to increase exports and therefore to increase the production of textiles 
and miscellaneous goods. Also, it enabled us to reduce a part of our imports 
and then to stimulate the development of new industries. In addition, 
an increase in military demands played a role for prosperity from domestic 
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side, with imcreasing inportance. Owing to these conditons, our country 
alone could enjoy prosperity, though other countries were suffering from 
depression. As shown in Table 12, the rise in prices during the prosperous 
period was very small. We can say that we enjoyed prosperity without 
inflation. 
Table 12. 
Wholesale Price In. Wage per Day per The Rate of Foreign Price Index of Im-
dex in Tokyo Capita for Laborers Exchange (for 100 port Goods (1913~ 
(Oct. of 1900~100) m manufacturing yen) 100) 
Industries 
yen doller 
1930 181.0 2.00~ 49.367 121.8 
1931 153.0 1.870 49.375 86.7 
1932 161.1 1.909 26.454 105.1 
1933 179.5 1.879 25.227 135.6 
1934 177.6 1.891 29.51 I 149.2 
1935 185.5 1.877 28.571 --
1936 197.5 1.901 28.951 --
Source; Price Index--Index by Bank of Japan, The Reference Book of Monetary 
Matters. (KinyiijikO SankOsyo) 
Wage-The Cabinet Bureau of Statistics. 
The Rate of Foreign Exchange-Economic Year Book (Keizai Nenkan) by 
Tayo Keizai Shinp6 Sh3. 
The Price of Import Goods-A Survey of Japanese Foreign Trade. 
(Nippon Boeki Seiran). 
We shall consider how the phase of accumulation after the end of World 
War I contributed to this phase of advance in which we had an increase in 
exports and prosperity without a price rise. 
I. Rapid increase of exports. First of all, let us investigate the ex-
port situation. After the gold embargo in December 1931, export from our 
country rapidly increased, because of the fall in exchange rate after the lat-
ter half of 1932, in spite of the decline in the total amount of world trade. 
We shall explain the following three characteristics of our export trade in 
this period. 
( a) Items of export changed compared with preceding periods. In a 
word, Japan became able to export commodities in competition with more 
advanced countries. Until this period, most Japanese exports were limited 
to special products of our country or products of inferior quality. As for 
such products, there were no competition in price with products of more 
advanced countries and the foreign demand for those products depended 
mainly on the purchasing power of the importing country. But as a result 
of the development of industries competing with import goods, competitive 
34 H. AOYAMA and T. NISHIKAWA 
products in prices with foreign products came to be exported (for instance, 
fine cotton yarn, rayon yarn and so on). On the other hand, the percentage 
of exports depending on the purchasing power of importing countries, (for 
instance, raw silk) diminished among total exports. In other words, main 
items of export goods changed from income-elastic goods to price-elastic 
goods.') With this change, the fall in exchange rate was quite effective in 
the increase of exports from our country. In this sense, we can say that 
both capital formation in industries competing in import goods after World 
War I and investment in public utilities which supported the development 
of those industries greatly contributed to the increase of exports in this phase. 
Table 13. 
The Rate of Increase of Export and Import in the Period from 
1931 to 1934, classified by Regions. 
Regions I The Rate of Increase of Export from japan I The Rate of Increase of Import of japan 
Manchuria and K wantung 5.24 1.45 
China 0.81 1.15 
Other Asian Countries 2.29 1.95 
Europe 2.19 1.48 
North America 1.02 8.21 
South America 6.03 3.37 
Africa 3.09 4.37 
Oceania 3.01 1.83 
Export In 1934 (to the regIOn) 
The rate of increase of export Export in 1931 (to the region) 
. . Import in 1934 (from. the region) 
The rate of mcrease of Import Import in 1931 (from the region) 
Source; The Cabinet Bureau of Statistics, Statistical Year Book of 
japan (Nippon Teikoku Tiikei Nenkan) 
( b) It is quite true that export from our country increased by driving 
away foreign products through competition. But we cannot neglect the fact 
that export from our country in this period increased by creating new mar-
kets for manufactured products. 
Regions to which Japanese exports greatly increased during this period 
were underdeveloped regions like Asia except China, Central and South 
9) According to T. C. Chang'S estimates, the elasticity of substitution between exported cotton 
cloths from Japan and those from Britain in the Asian market. (-1.94, in India, and -2.31 
in China), See T. a. Chang, Cyclical Movements in the Balance of Payments, Cambridge, 
1951, p. 74. 
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America and Africa!') We can see this fact from Table 13. As elasticity 
of demand for import in these underdeveloped agricultural countries or raw 
material producing countries is generally larger than' !) that of industrial co-
untries, the appearance of cheap Japanese products increased the demand 
so much for manufactured products' in the underdeveloped countries and 
thus Japanese export rapidly increased. 
( c ) As already explained in the second section, the percentage of J a-
panese exports to regions in which Japanese political power was dominant 
(such as Manchuria, Korea and Formosa) increased as barriers to free inter-
national trade were made stronger. (See Table 6.) We would like to add 
that capital export to Manchuria after this period amounted to an enormous 
sum, so that export of investment goods fr.:Jm our country greatly increased 
and that this was one of the important factors which promoted the develop-
ment of heavy industries as well as chemical industries of our country in that 
period. 
Table 14. 
Japanese Investment in Manchuria (in millions of yen) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Data published Data by Minis· The sum of paid.up capital of 
by Bank of try of Finance Japanse compames in Manchuria 







1932 73 119 616 
1933 137 118 810 
1934 278 244 839 
1935 387 247 944 
1936 229 -- --
• The figure for 1935 in the column (2) IS not the amount of the whole 
a year, but for the nine months from Jan. to Sept. 
2. Continuance of prosperity without inflation. Next, we shall look 
at the domestic situation at that time. In this period, there was a large 
increase in demand. which was helped by the increase of exports and govern-
ment expenditure, and' there was the rise in imported raw material prices 
caused by the fall in the rate of foreign exchange. Nevertheless the rise in 
the general price level was still very small. (Table 12 above) 
10) . As clearly seen in Table 13. the amount of export to China declined. But We have to take 
into account the facts that Japanese cotton spinnins- factories operated in Chinese territory and 
cotton textiles produced in China were sold there in those days. Therefore the actual amount 
of supply of Japanese goods to China might be larger than the published figure of export 
to China. 
11) T. C. Chang, Op. Cit., p. 42. 
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We had such a favorable situation that both production level and in-
come level steadily increased. We shall consider what brought about the 
good situation and how the capital formation in the period after World 
War I contributed to give rise to prosperity without inflation. 
We can see from the movement of price index shown in Table 12 that 
prices were stable untill about 1935. The price rise after 1935 seems to have 
been caused by the fact that we were about to arrive at nearly a full 
utilization of capital equipment at that time. Government expenditure ra-
pidly increased in those days, particularly in military expenditure, and it 
came to be financed by selling national bonds to the central bank--an 
increased issue of paper money. Though the expansion of government ex-
penditure in this way has usually inflationary effects, the effects were not 
clearly revealed by about 1935, because the public demand for loanable 
funds was not so large and because the national bonds sold to- the central 
bank could be resold to the public. But the expansion in government ex-
penditure, particularly in military expenditure mainly increased government 
demand for investment industries, and therefore capital equipment of invest-
ment industries (of consumption goods industries, also by the repercussions 
from investment goods industries) gradually came to be fully utilized. Such 
change appeared and prices began to rise as the result of continous increase 
of effective demand in 1935. Moreover, the tendency towards a price rise 
was strengthened by the increased issue of bank notes which was encouraged 
by the new situation, that is the difficulties for the central bank to resell 
national bonds to the public caused by the increase in demand for invest-
ment funds. As known well, usually at the beginning of a business expan-
sion, the elasticity of supply is so large that prices hardly rise and prices 
begin to rise when bottle-necks begin to appear at a high level of economic 
activity. In the period of prosperity beginning in 1932, bottle-necks are 
supposed to have appeared in capital equipment in about 1935. 
As for conditions of labor market, the underemployment continued still 
until later years and the money wage rate did not rise by the time of the 
outbreak of the war with China, as seen in Table 12. It is very natural 
tha t there are broad tendency to explain the stability of price level in this 
period from the low wage rate of this period. It is certain that the average 
money wage rate in all industries was almost unchanged and it even decli-
ned in some industries. Since the price level slightly rose, we can say the 
real wage rate fell a little. This was brought by the fact that it was 
easy to get low wage workers from farming families whose income levels 
were very low because of the drastic fall in raw silk export due to the de-
pression in the U.S.A. and because of the low price of rice, which itself was 
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a cause of low wage rate' ), due to the inflow from the colonies, as ex-
plained in the second section as one of the characteristics of this period. 
Thus, we can say that investment in agricultural projects, transportation and 
port facilities in colonies after World War I showed effects on economic 
conditions of the prosperous period after 1932 as explained above. 
It is needless to say that raw materials are one of the important factors 
in production as well as capital equipment and labour force. In an economy, 
like our country, depending on the import of the important raw materials, 
elasticity of those materials in foreign supplying countries as well as the sol-
vency of our country is one of the important factors to determine the price 
leveL It is true that prices of import goods in terms of Japanese currency 
were raised by the fall of the foreign exchange rate in those days as shown 
in Table 12_ But, if we discount the fall if) the exchange rate, those 
prices had declined. This was because of low prices of industrial materials 
in the world market due to the great depression and because our country 
was able to import a sufficient amount of cheap materials by paying from 
abundant foreign exchange reserves which was gained by export of commo-
dities and by the income from invisible trade!') 
Thus it is very difficult to find any factor to raise the price level in the 
conditions of factors of production such as capital equipment and labor force, 
until about 1935. But now that prices of import goods in terms of our 
currency were actually raised by the fall in foreign exchange rate, there must 






(1920) (1926) (1931) (1935) 
Source; K. Okawa; The Rate of Growth in Japanese Economy, 
Supplementary Tables. (JVippon Keizai no SeichOritsu) 
I) We should add a similar as for those consumption goods which common Japanese people 
consumed in their daily life before World War II. Most of these daily consumption goods 
were of traditional kind and produced by very small firms in the traditional way of produc~ 
tion, just like as rice, though some of raw materials which are necessary for their production 
might be produced by big firms, and imported from abroad. Thus, most of daily consump-
tion goods in the market basket of common Japanese people were supplied with big elasti-
city" Although this pattern of consumption is now going to change very rapidly as a result 
of introduction of the American-typed if durable consumer goods" and so on, this tendency 
still remains in present-day Japan. 
12) This point of view is seen in K. Takahashi, Op. Cit., p. 1509. 
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'have necessarily existed some factors which worked to lower the price levels 
and offset effects of this rise in prices of import goods s~ as to keep the 
price level from rising. We can say that this factor was the rise in labor 
productivity. The labor productivity was raised as shown in Chart 9. 
Let us take some examples of particular industries. The increase in the 
number of new machines of better quality and the increase in the number 
of spindles per laborer in the cotton spinning industry is an example for 
this progress and the reduction in the amount of pulp to produce rayon 
·and the rise in labor productivity in the cement industry by 60% in the 
period from 1930 to 1933 give other instances. The major contribution of 
capital formation in the preceeding period after the end of World War I 
to the prosperous period was that it raised the labor productivity. 
The capital formation ,in the period after the end of World War I 
contributed to the increase in exports and the continuance of prosperity 
without inflation in the period after 1932 as explained above. The progress 
in electric power generation is one of the essential conditions to make the 
progress in heavy industries and the chemical industries possible and the 
capital formation in the phase of accumulation after World War I, such as 
the progress in transportation and communication facilities, the progress in 
professional education and industrial development in colonies which brought 
about the low price of rice, supported the phase of advance after 1932.13) 
13) Two effects of capital formation in the period after World War I on the prosperity in the 
period after 1932 have to be referred to, besides those explained above. One is the develop-
ment of small scale firms. The table shows the proportion of the number of factories of 
from 5 to 39 employees among the total number of factories (of more than 5 employees), 
according to factory statistics. The development of small scale firms was stimulated by the 
expansion of home markets and foreign markets in this period, and also it was stimulated 
by the development in electric power generation which facilitated the supply of power at 
low cost for small scale firms. It must be added that small scale firms played the role of 
buffer for business cycles. 
Secondly, with the concentration of population in cities, a change in the pattern of consump-









There were so many industries whose development was stimulated by 
the change in the pattern of consu'mption. For example. the develop-
ment of glass and cement production was stimulated by the construction 
of modern buildings in cities; and the development of deep sea fishery 
industry, the production of fruits and vegetables, glass production through 
the use of bottles, the production of beer and sugar refining were stimutated by changes in 
the contents of diet; and the development of paper manufacturing and printing industries 
by the improvement in cultural life, and the increase of electric bulb production by the 
increased use of electric lighting and so on. Moreover, the progress in finished goods 
production encouraged the progress in the production of materials. For example, the 
production of soda ash and caustic soda was stimulated by the development of glass and 
rayon production, and the production of pulp increased by the development of rayon and 
paper production. It may be needless to say that the progress in electric power generation 
in the preceding period greatly contributed to these development in many industries. In 
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V. Conclusion 
"The phase of accumulation and the phase of advance" is the basis 
of the above study. Using a somewhat clumsy simile we may say that these 
phases may be comparable to the measuring worm which first draws in its 
body and then stretches it to its full length or it may be like the electric 
energy stored in the battery by charging and put to work when discharging 
and thus it seems to be possible to understand business cycles in Japanese 
economy as the alternation of the two phases. Moreover, the two phases 
are related to each other, that is to say, the phase of advance is prepared 
for in the phase of accumulation, and on the other hand, the phase of ac-
cumulation is made possible by the phase of advance. We can conclude that 
this close inter-relation between the two phases is the most important chara. 
cteristic to be found in business cycles in Japanese economy. 
addition, it is obvious that there are other contributing factors to these developments, such as 
the progress in railway transportation which facilitated the transportation of indUSll'ial maw 
terials (for example, the transportation of lime stone to produce glass), Thus. We can See 
that .the U accumulation" in the preceding period (particularly in public utilities) greatly 
contrIbuted to the U advance" in this period. 
